https://fwgl.zfcxjw.cq.gov.cn:9090/site/cqgzf/extendrentpublic/extendinfopublicity
逆向记录
尝试hook debugger会被检测到走错误分支,导致接口响应400/412

清空网站数据 关掉控制台 重新加载恢复正常

https://fwgl.zfcxjw.cq.gov.cn:9090/DaGPddCX1LOD/loU7UHj8yHz6.2a95215.js
<script src='/DaGPddCX1LOD/loU7UHj8yHz6.2a95215.js' r='m'></script>替换不让网页加载该JS即可绕过debugger;屏蔽该JS URL加载应该可以。

说明主要逻辑在该JS中,但是cookie还没过期,接口还能正常响应。

查看接口:https://fwgl.zfcxjw.cq.gov.cn:9090/site/cqgzf/extendrentpublic/getXzjgAction,观察没有什么签名/加密参数,code为固定值。
响应不一样,返回如下响应;看起来是cookie中M9RnUaA6zJ2uP参数的问题;
412<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"><html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"> <meta id="GrEmvmXsI7Hv" content="MyDh0.nFsjPy.j8uQirbnczo00dRLb32wDTy0G3NKG2b3CLWUgBRLPKEvr7SsYpJ1M6gLh5DfALV2uLHFkNCtLKj5c6fcd.e8WYoqywUawo4qQhp56DZgoZAYJPuaBabZtIn.SjFurm3nV9DeSq5aLi1XTKItgHjQaKQfi6UZiFLZX9YKfeIjAwQHfnEq7WtqCiIpAq6NgYIt4oEiWQRIyRM_PKCks.uahe3c38fpH7CyvkJUjt8p05dqfGXp0aK.45J966P62_RNU6CC6yA0X9051MYFKggyISHme8ABpdwLBGXsKon.q3SeIwrTLyK3jkpmYHQD6X.hdzAQnRTUwUjFjvXr8VdEDeumooJp18hcQK8vtgE0Cfye.xwlyjaU9.Pdz5Y2QF.e9eifAFTCaZierZ3futoxI2dKXTVj9IuGL.2_rSKTObPG84V9FObLtdnKEIpYbepzMIL3_8IuNcUIDBm9hlJCeZ4FyW5W8vinAa.llaZaIZeWeacmCqzQP1pbdVO51FtSelsdfDsTUpazHaL7.SE3EyrENNRibTNt8UKt.rMT_DpJ6qRc2QutvxgxyLpmD6vAkJ1DgRC4sZpe.LVIJcBBq3pl2p0iF1oOYPB6wJ66nH.gdbNt9FPWN0oZfI2VlA0jF6B04DGMu_l6ielUXvRgGnV_1UKmuC9S28AC6DKWh4w_LRSjgcnwTqEMpmTLMe.uNAhAn17V5GtHA1bmdsMwsgDr6MiINsuto3mUIxyLCab9cHWZUyU8vLzDoYJcvfR8FDjTZMEVW1T4tJG30cY" r="m"> <!--[if lt IE 9]> <script r='m'>document.createElement("section")</script> <![endif]--> <script type="text/javascript" r='m'> $_ss=window['$_ss'];if(!$_ss)$_ss={};$_ss.nsd=102049; $_ss.cd="qtexrrAliGLrDAGEqqLocGAaJaGqcGEtquqIcGlRcqGqcGQtrkq6cqqttGLkWkQtqp9mcGAaHaVEqcEcruEYx1ZErrgEqqLrcG33JaGqcGAtrsq6cGqaHaVEtqLDruEYx1ZxrcatqOqdqnqqcGqtqsq6cGAaHaVtqf9GcqqtqqLrWkQEqqQncGGqEG3oWfV2haLloALcWkZkcP9aHaEEqqLocGAaJaGqcGEtquq6cGrBxx7TJaQuWOA3MZDhc.QatveOafZrO1Bm_8ogscZGniRVlhpnVfBWYdiDCVMJqwmwISMavT6rEXqEjqWctGKohDBZW02zFvefWXyK3KGSH6xjL2xJsTwmw2j7ilRkMbyuKFNGiolusUSZdoYHH9GdYbIW39EuI0aCItxo39xY3brtasxH19leW6Pz3bwuFCwGpQ74iDJUWYpgCbEaJ2VuH18.3OLaJuQSxdJaimTHskTEZ9Ny32S7Ac8.3OLaJuQSxdJaiD2jVuJQ0K94IlTZWP8.3OLaJuQSxdJailyvwKNsZYJbsKfsRPIuQkfqUC9CI8yHiuTt3YlnZuzrV6Y2RT.dRkxvHOxiKWWSFomzICy.eufEMKTusbUKpoq0WuljidG_JOQ0WnNO_OfB3uETM0iXADRDR6AjidG_JOQ0WnNO_OGzJCAdWsXLJPTBwOTk8eSXwKfwwV050UVgAYeGID.H1KetIDrKcRGuqOAsMvre_UqyWsQ5Jun.iOWSJkaTWt9_WaW6Ru0ZjuEoJkWdWGiLJsE6JkgSH_96cOW0JklyjO3CJSUTXhWqNLVVZqdJlERX.UVEmzo7kyocCmvgkRcFqq3qqaE91tKbstLaUk4B89E5nk5OcX6FaqL5SgBGoCGk2sUuThQrjkA0WkaSHsC3WG90WOl0it9nJuVarGAE.AEurktlMs4OhCx9RPN2Ri7B3vYXtbY_ecePQCajRbOnhCm9Q1Nb3HQB3KfTtbRujneGtKRvRPU_RblNRbJbQMYGMDGNRKzvdCN9tKRCwcU_QoqNRvYnxITPwn2fFbG2dKy9tKmNRnUeMDretKx.IMYbMb9N3CzezKR6tKr531UdMCEN3CNvxIeBw12OFKL2dCSzQ12GF6CTRDwvtKm7R.Y9FbWN3Ug2ZKeutKTCwcUSwCqNMUx0FiNawDlNMCwbzKNzRP2BFb5TFbT7tKej8.YjQCANM6wbzK2Pwn27RUdghC2T3DlL3529hCeCtby_eb0BFKS9tDUCRceLWKQLRHfuhCffWnf9ZDQBFDS.tDsnw1eLFbELRHRThCfTJ1f9_sQBFoYvtDsNRbANFoROxIpuQn2LwK02eCNBtKN9MPUC3o7NFbmOxIRB312jFbl2evw2tKNaR1UN3vqNwKY28MYuRCWNwbJ9zUJjRP2CFDcTQCe7wvEL8Iw9h6YTFnfy_UqBwUYntovNw67NwUYGx82_h6YZR1fg5bS0Jn26MK5TQvwetUp2x8zPMP26R632_CR9tUwOwnU.MPe6Forbx8z6R126Qb2yzUrfF12T3vDTQDz9tUY7FtGBQDLNwUY2zUrT3P2TQCPTQopOtUYe8.Y63vQNQbYuzUw9In2nMK5TwCNO3nNaRXzSRbzStvredne6IUljQv.eh6YCwPNn8XgBwUTftvJL_ne0RoWjQCu4MPen3Dp0x8yX3P2nF6E24bS23n2SFCddW1enwUVLQIzXh6TNw1fSeUr4tUT.FcUfQCgNIUYLx8myh6ZNIDTybAwQEKw8qmFexTVrKPxOpxTQxCrOrkVSbuA0rkAoJAbRqaWqWu30iF9mWOV6JOqabAqnJkW"; if($_ss.lcd)$_ss.lcd(); </script> <script type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8" src="/DaGPddCX1LOD/loU7UHj8yHz6.2a95215.js" r='m'></script></head><body></body></html>重新抓包一个新cookie参数即可,参数过期了。
参数的生成算法可能与被屏蔽的JS相关,有效时间很短(可能1分钟左右)。
M9RnUaA6zJ2uP
GrEmvmXsI7Hv
关键词搜索不到相关信息,猜测是在/DaGPddCX1LOD/loU7UHj8yHz6.2a95215.js中动态生成的js代码执行
这段代码不是直接业务逻辑,而是一个高度混淆/虚拟机式的前端壳:
它在 window[’$_ss’] 下挂了一套内部 API,动态解密并 eval 真实脚本,同时实现调试防护与复杂的表单/事件/环境采集逻辑,典型用途是风控埋点、反爬虫或防篡改。

call 这里使用eval 执行了生成的js代码 这段代码是 $_ss 框架中的“风控内核”:通过自定义虚拟机执行混淆字节码,对 URL 跳转/点击等行为进行加密记录和策略判断(允许/替换/阻止),配合本地存储和复杂的编码/加密逻辑实现前端反爬虫、防滥用和埋点/风控功能,同时大量使用反调试与混淆技术隐藏实现细节。
这段代码是一个高度工程化的数据处理模块,是整个指纹系统的核心。

8月27日 22:54
注入标记,DevTools 的 Sources 面板里会出现一个名为 ruishu-jsvmp.js 的虚拟文件,而不是随机的 VM123,影响每次调试标记。
_$$i += '\n//# sourceURL=ruishu-jsvmp.js', false- 通过每次传入不同的字节码,计算不同变量名的混淆JSVMP字符串jscode
- 通过
eval.call(window, jscode);执行真实业务代码 - jscode中会随机插入50+ 处明文debugger(不固定,少的时候50,多的时候57处)
- 直接正则替换明文debugger会语法报错。
- ast替换DebuggerStatement会走错分支,报错:变量未定义。
- jscode运行时还会存在类似下面的无限debugger(通过运行时动态拼接字符串而来)
// 形式一(function anonymous(_$db) {debugger;_$db(17878382948560)})// 形式二(function() {var a = new Date(); debugger; return new Date() - a > 100;}())- jscode还存在正则检测自身代码被格式或debugger被移除的自卫代码。
RegExp(/debugger/).test(fn.toString())hook Function.prototype , 查自卫代码调用。
https://fwgl.zfcxjw.cq.gov.cn:9090/site/cqgzf/extendrentpublic/extendinfopublicity 接口正常第一次返回412, 错误的cookie值会返回400.
"IP:", _$_T, "Opcode:", _$mu, "Stack:", safeStringify(_$i_.slice(0, _$dp))


hook cookie
Object.defineProperty(document, 'cookie', { set(v) { debugger; console.log('cookie set:', v); }});在位置 _$bB[_$f6] = _$kz) : _$bO <= 49 ? (_$gQ[_$j1] = 102, 处新增了一个cookie值”enable_M9RnUaA6zJ2u=true; Secure”
但是并不是想要的那个,不过有点关系,有部分相同的名称。至少方向应该是对的,

在函数 function _$$u(_$a1, _$fv, _$$L, _$$4) 中发现大量熟悉的值。
日志点打印一下,循环太多直接卡死了。
不过确实找到相关生成信息。
这个函数名每次不一定相同,不过每次函数的特征相同,4个入参,里面一个大循环。

这里保存了大量猜测是加密的常量。

"be0Jhoye;wUbm49vc;QNJRCrS5;EFkhwP3c;t6KxuevL;M9RnUaA6zJ2u;DaGPddCX1LOD;7q4advnadLR8;fR7PqCa33P59.2a95215.js;XJJ9AkIzgYjD.2a95215.js;loU7UHj8yHz6.2a95215.js;KbsnZhPeHmUb.js;EZo2twL88OgU;j8BVpccSfg1b;4JQZ2kthyjbn;KhhuJlOGs167.2a95215.js;lf73kJ7CeCbr.2a95215.js;.2a95215.js;GrEmvmXsI7Hv;DZfxcVJlOyfR"
确定该大循环为入口,其中具体到该行_ _$bi[_$g_] = _$_B) : _$i9 <= 49 ? (_$ml[_$hQ] = 102_
每次生成的js代码变量名和函数名可能不同,但是代码结构与常量一致。
奇怪的是,有时候并未执行到这里便生成了cookie。可能是缓存吧。
这里eval执行的代码,通过代码不方便去更好的修改自定义,就准备自己定义一个字符串代码$ss_eval_code去执行,但是代码中的字符转移什么的也不是很方便,复制的字符串还需要经过处理,修改代码也需要添加转义。
所以便直接复制为代码去直接调用函数运行,而不是使用eval执行代码字符串。
即方便了自行修改调试,也钉死了变量名等。

但是调用方式变了,环境也会有点变化,会导致一些地方报错。
一个固定长度471的字符串, 短了就是环境不对
关键代码处,自定义vm解释器
M9RnUaA6zJ2uP
// 第一次出现生成值。固定471位。IP: 156 Opcode: 47 Stack: ["0HjE5Jp6En3gcG_g6a_NqpwjhzGyecDTPTqJ4ufk8YrR1mDZVVmTd_bsG6e7qC2h635x248C.4ZoiODqrVippqjFZPOZXgdXLiUvsQBQVbBPRk82ip8eP2T55ME2tgJcchYIsROaeTHLfIxRDgq8nMp6RnMxbmctlACRysRNyBfEXy0hAescV6ctC5_KXj.mEbMHCmk97vKrxyRokKbQiVZTpFF.hvSF2I4by3AviY9ofuYIwOr3ukHABqExbJlKzdOR8NGe.5.pdaxiGCjpUgkNQ1d_DCCpyJiHfMysZpH.cMb7azUjmYr4QN.gV70pO4ZTgkgJ.ZO4lopd0jlQ4OtGKPkU_P1Anv5YvW.rmuZHD0L1GkID9tTK0Oyq4ONxt9jompuU.2pnAjdtb14QIMvSnhF82L4xBt95F53YiqiHGURmSRa4AoriRIPyZKasDmA7ENRnCHGufBcy2GZQXuA"]IP: 156 Opcode: 47 Stack: ["0G9rzRP3yuSTdPrxDKGiNd.W4U2gehKOH9h2KMO0lf2i6Cfbbwu7DMcXJdEZ.Fwmuv2qtcSnRq5AfHc8vwBjtbzpaWrNgaAUwkLAERp7DHu97gErWSc_xS30n_Aqi_4IqEjzW8qmzgUaKdfY9jKbg3iaDkwqTeuiyZu6nBidnADeWeVTDxJgjAubh.bqKflRcxtXxHF0rS6KV4ZhovQunPqatNsTITLEtue3lCNeCJZP3r4sJhQBnM.eAyk7GKrxSzWHjnm4HuPxhHySz5NcmEA14hiV.ilpO_rx0WiIrUsbJCpnWjVROEu0swuXF1p5i7XWFqlYm.4WFxE6DHSf1NDbjL_hXpWBTPVV6H1FBU4Q.hpPRC.TUIn4jG8im9a45Xx1.PZAgt0s7KwXa0X7Q8LdCFckE1p.mLYKJawXVAwVoR1ex5ribS2usG42g.jDAsyMEHFv1ODI11vxxM9Ih7A"]上下文
VM26161:1 IP: 150 Opcode: 10 Stack: [0,[604800,11,24,5,10,240,32,4194304,12,192,3,255,27,19,128,2,31,127,58,16,1024,134217728,9,16777216,13,6,256,100,18,30,8,20,65535,126,37,25,64,131072,14,8388608,2097151,7,4294967296,134217727,65536,63,4,33,2097152,200,1000,33554432,268435456,-1,32768,34,15,8192,4294967295,512,224,90,17,92,-0.01,65,257,55,41,180,40960,47,1048576,35,300,68,40,201,52,86,62,42,28,2048,39,29,21,268435455,56,16383,0.01,100000,93,26,203,16843008,45,122,60,262144,44,53,-4,89,79,23,57,0,51,536870912,43,-100,38,46,72,102,71,4096,2654435769,283,82,2000,50,248,48,36,59,500,1500,10240,65537,3000,0.35,97,-0.2,56320,75,2531011,3145728,0.26,-0.9,0.8,2400959708,99,191,0.813264543,-0.26,1800,5000,1732584193,0.2,3285377520,254,15679,80,16843009,1518500249,2500,1001,55296,-7,-90,3395469782,20000,112,30000,-180,98,-2,5089,1000000,1859775393,271733878,0.1,0.4,85,3988292384,16777215,3500,4023233417,86400000,252,2562383102,0.6,0.9,164,360,3337565984,1048575,138,165,157,148,178,131,147,146,145,160,174,177,185,188,140,134,168,129,170,163]]VM26161:1 IP: 152 Opcode: 37 Stack: [0,[604800,11,24,5,10,240,32,4194304,12,192,3,255,27,19,128,2,31,127,58,16,1024,134217728,9,16777216,13,6,256,100,18,30,8,20,65535,126,37,25,64,131072,14,8388608,2097151,7,4294967296,134217727,65536,63,4,33,2097152,200,1000,33554432,268435456,-1,32768,34,15,8192,4294967295,512,224,90,17,92,-0.01,65,257,55,41,180,40960,47,1048576,35,300,68,40,201,52,86,62,42,28,2048,39,29,21,268435455,56,16383,0.01,100000,93,26,203,16843008,45,122,60,262144,44,53,-4,89,79,23,57,0,51,536870912,43,-100,38,46,72,102,71,4096,2654435769,283,82,2000,50,248,48,36,59,500,1500,10240,65537,3000,0.35,97,-0.2,56320,75,2531011,3145728,0.26,-0.9,0.8,2400959708,99,191,0.813264543,-0.26,1800,5000,1732584193,0.2,3285377520,254,15679,80,16843009,1518500249,2500,1001,55296,-7,-90,3395469782,20000,112,30000,-180,98,-2,5089,1000000,1859775393,271733878,0.1,0.4,85,3988292384,16777215,3500,4023233417,86400000,252,2562383102,0.6,0.9,164,360,3337565984,1048575,138,165,157,148,178,131,147,146,145,160,174,177,185,188,140,134,168,129,170,163],147]VM26161:1 IP: 153 Opcode: 43 Stack: [0,1800]VM26161:1 IP: 154 Opcode: 25 Stack: [false]VM26161:1 IP: 159 Opcode: 54 Stack: []VM26161:1 IP: 161 Opcode: 47 Stack: [[243,188,186,153,165,134,17,245,9,201,25,31,109,174,112,13]]VM26161:1 IP: 142 Opcode: 48 Stack: [[130,64,109,102,38,57,207,29,127,136,18,70,90,3,169,254,179,59,94,94,61,45,104,207,144,185,86,110,61,4,134,83,183,218,25,166,119,59,6,108,43,141,252,143,43,105,209,115,158,80,10,11,28,153,3,228,33,60,39,167,118,250,138,154,212,112,48,26,120,193,5,221,14,132,8,101,27,6,63,57,44,224,128,76,196,46,137,197,141,50,233,0,14,235,183,192,34,171,76,120,1,109,225,124,22,254,21,100,169,105,184,96,236,6,13,208,53,247,51,185,243,61,242,188,239,242,64,111,76,245,77,70,36,222,42,67,57,139,174,96,22,132,70,66,36,171,137,61,173,1,199,117,148,239,194,199,157,204,242,136,12,10,165,61,95,214,130,10,207,214,4,218,159,118,55,200,152,7,180,205,45,203,242,110,191,80,228,59,32,88,18,113,180,195,234,200,94,207,206,34,75,63,156,109,250,144,133,33,4,187,44,229,43,56,68,99,232,18,116,48,231,193,93,57,141,217,28,140,169,70,99,35,61,19,119,59,154,73,31,142,178,227,26,0,69,69,175,179,26,36,141,198,63,24,82,164,105,170,163,162,238,68,203,245,137,69,55,61,38,175,95,183,43,45,24,153,218,189,87,127,46,234,129,227,133,147,14,254,184,148,171,139,196,56,43,68,236,89,219,176,210,235,28,122,143,246,104,32,200,73,26,197,161,85,141,193,219,148,65,213,7,101,47,73,248,19,166,198,92,211,131,185,120,174,161,144,79,150,200,61,169,210,140,103,210,74,114,73,110,71,203,177]]VM26161:1 IP: 145 Opcode: 53 Stack: []VM26161:1 IP: 147 Opcode: 10 Stack: [[".","]","matchMedia","document","onreadystatechange","pathname","keydown","hasOwnProperty","i","result","nodeName","HTMLFormElement","max",";","0","Math","parentNode","button","fetch","substr","input","innerHTML","splice","getTime","\"","1","set","(","pff0","div","appName","src","form","candidate","$b_callHandler","now","mousedown","exec","boolean","attributes","pop","isArray","click","port","[","setAttribute","pfb0"," ==> ","setInterval","$_YVTXS","m","getBoundingClientRect","close","Microsoft.XMLHTTP","}","MediaStreamTrack","visibility","responseXML","mousemove","POST","host","response","; Secure","___TS___","touchend","getData","description","XMLHttpRequest","eB87bC0","fonts","onsuccess","keys","load","stringify","isNaN","constructor","setItem","x","hostname","screen","offsetHeight","clearInterval","clipboardData","getItem","MicroMessenger","matches","offsetWidth","self","mouseup","ceil","statusText","charset","ontimeout","%","orientation","mediaDevices"]]VM26161:1 IP: 149 Opcode: 37 Stack: [[".","]","matchMedia","document","onreadystatechange","pathname","keydown","hasOwnProperty","i","result","nodeName","HTMLFormElement","max",";","0","Math","parentNode","button","fetch","substr","input","innerHTML","splice","getTime","\"","1","set","(","pff0","div","appName","src","form","candidate","$b_callHandler","now","mousedown","exec","boolean","attributes","pop","isArray","click","port","[","setAttribute","pfb0"," ==> ","setInterval","$_YVTXS","m","getBoundingClientRect","close","Microsoft.XMLHTTP","}","MediaStreamTrack","visibility","responseXML","mousemove","POST","host","response","; Secure","___TS___","touchend","getData","description","XMLHttpRequest","eB87bC0","fonts","onsuccess","keys","load","stringify","isNaN","constructor","setItem","x","hostname","screen","offsetHeight","clearInterval","clipboardData","getItem","MicroMessenger","matches","offsetWidth","self","mouseup","ceil","statusText","charset","ontimeout","%","orientation","mediaDevices"],14]VM26161:1 IP: 150 Opcode: 54 Stack: ["0"]VM26161:1 IP: 152 Opcode: 7 Stack: ["0",[130,64,109,102,38,57,207,29,127,136,18,70,90,3,169,254,179,59,94,94,61,45,104,207,144,185,86,110,61,4,134,83,183,218,25,166,119,59,6,108,43,141,252,143,43,105,209,115,158,80,10,11,28,153,3,228,33,60,39,167,118,250,138,154,212,112,48,26,120,193,5,221,14,132,8,101,27,6,63,57,44,224,128,76,196,46,137,197,141,50,233,0,14,235,183,192,34,171,76,120,1,109,225,124,22,254,21,100,169,105,184,96,236,6,13,208,53,247,51,185,243,61,242,188,239,242,64,111,76,245,77,70,36,222,42,67,57,139,174,96,22,132,70,66,36,171,137,61,173,1,199,117,148,239,194,199,157,204,242,136,12,10,165,61,95,214,130,10,207,214,4,218,159,118,55,200,152,7,180,205,45,203,242,110,191,80,228,59,32,88,18,113,180,195,234,200,94,207,206,34,75,63,156,109,250,144,133,33,4,187,44,229,43,56,68,99,232,18,116,48,231,193,93,57,141,217,28,140,169,70,99,35,61,19,119,59,154,73,31,142,178,227,26,0,69,69,175,179,26,36,141,198,63,24,82,164,105,170,163,162,238,68,203,245,137,69,55,61,38,175,95,183,43,45,24,153,218,189,87,127,46,234,129,227,133,147,14,254,184,148,171,139,196,56,43,68,236,89,219,176,210,235,28,122,143,246,104,32,200,73,26,197,161,85,141,193,219,148,65,213,7,101,47,73,248,19,166,198,92,211,131,185,120,174,161,144,79,150,200,61,169,210,140,103,210,74,114,73,110,71,203,177]]VM26161:1 IP: 155 Opcode: 6 Stack: ["0","G9rzRP3yuSTdPrxDKGiNd.W4U2gehKOH9h2KMO0lf2i6Cfbbwu7DMcXJdEZ.Fwmuv2qtcSnRq5AfHc8vwBjtbzpaWrNgaAUwkLAERp7DHu97gErWSc_xS30n_Aqi_4IqEjzW8qmzgUaKdfY9jKbg3iaDkwqTeuiyZu6nBidnADeWeVTDxJgjAubh.bqKflRcxtXxHF0rS6KV4ZhovQunPqatNsTITLEtue3lCNeCJZP3r4sJhQBnM.eAyk7GKrxSzWHjnm4HuPxhHySz5NcmEA14hiV.ilpO_rx0WiIrUsbJCpnWjVROEu0swuXF1p5i7XWFqlYm.4WFxE6DHSf1NDbjL_hXpWBTPVV6H1FBU4Q.hpPRC.TUIn4jG8im9a45Xx1.PZAgt0s7KwXa0X7Q8LdCFckE1p.mLYKJawXVAwVoR1ex5ribS2usG42g.jDAsyMEHFv1ODI11vxxM9Ih7A"]VM26161:1 IP: 156 Opcode: 47 Stack: ["0G9rzRP3yuSTdPrxDKGiNd.W4U2gehKOH9h2KMO0lf2i6Cfbbwu7DMcXJdEZ.Fwmuv2qtcSnRq5AfHc8vwBjtbzpaWrNgaAUwkLAERp7DHu97gErWSc_xS30n_Aqi_4IqEjzW8qmzgUaKdfY9jKbg3iaDkwqTeuiyZu6nBidnADeWeVTDxJgjAubh.bqKflRcxtXxHF0rS6KV4ZhovQunPqatNsTITLEtue3lCNeCJZP3r4sJhQBnM.eAyk7GKrxSzWHjnm4HuPxhHySz5NcmEA14hiV.ilpO_rx0WiIrUsbJCpnWjVROEu0swuXF1p5i7XWFqlYm.4WFxE6DHSf1NDbjL_hXpWBTPVV6H1FBU4Q.hpPRC.TUIn4jG8im9a45Xx1.PZAgt0s7KwXa0X7Q8LdCFckE1p.mLYKJawXVAwVoR1ex5ribS2usG42g.jDAsyMEHFv1ODI11vxxM9Ih7A"]"IP:", _$_T, "Opcode:", _$mu, "Stack:", safeStringify(_$i_.slice(0, _$dp))"IP:", idx, "Opcode:", attr, "Stack:", safeStringify(obj.slice(0, index))
"IP:", _$cQ, "Opcode:", _$_l, "Stack:", safeStringify(_$b9.slice(0, _$g_))
"IP:", _$hF, "Opcode:", _$_m, "Stack:", safeStringify(_$lB)
_$_T == 150 && _$$T[_$_T] == 7
_$fT == 152 && _$jn == 7
搜索常量“<= 63” 定位循环解释器位置。
_$hU == 161 && _$k$ == 47_$gt == 142 && _$d8 == 48
_$en.slice(0, _$be)
初步判断应该在 IP: 152 Opcode: 7 时的这段代码中生成了该值。


在 IP: 152 Opcode: 7 时的352位字节数组(每个元素是 0-255 的整数)经过该自定义base64编码,生成了最终m9的大部分值。
def custom_base64_encode(byte_array, char_set): """ 使用自定义字符集对字节数组进行 Base64 编码。 这个实现对应于分析的 JavaScript 函数 _$jW。 VM代码中 第2行,第42391列
Args: byte_array (list[int]): 包含 0-255 之间整数的列表或字节对象。 char_set (str): 用于编码的包含 64 个字符的字符串。
Returns: str: 编码后的字符串。 """
# 对应 JS: var _$mx, _$jn, _$b5, _$_H; # _$mx -> input_ptr # _$jn -> output_ptr # _$_H -> encoded_chars input_ptr = 0 encoded_chars = []
# 对应 JS: _$b5 = _$_Q[_$aq[0]]; input_len = len(byte_array)
# 对应 JS: _$b5 = _$_Q[_$aq[0]] - 2; # 主循环处理完整的 3 字节块 main_loop_end = input_len - 2
# 对应 JS: while (_$mx < _$b5) while input_ptr < main_loop_end: # 对应 JS: _$a$ = _$_Q[_$mx++], _$ex = _$_Q[_$mx++], ... byte1 = byte_array[input_ptr] input_ptr += 1 byte2 = byte_array[input_ptr] input_ptr += 1 byte3 = byte_array[input_ptr] input_ptr += 1
# --- Base64 核心位操作 --- # 对应 JS: _$_H[_$jn++] = _$_j[_$a$ >> 2]; # 第一个 6-bit 块: byte1 的高 6 位 index1 = byte1 >> 2 encoded_chars.append(char_set[index1])
# 对应 JS: _$_H[_$jn++] = _$_j[((_$a$ & 3) << 4) | (_$ex >> 4)]; # 第二个 6-bit 块: byte1 的低 2 位 + byte2 的高 4 位 index2 = ((byte1 & 3) << 4) | (byte2 >> 4) encoded_chars.append(char_set[index2])
# 对应 JS: _$_H[_$jn++] = _$_j[((_$ex & 15) << 2) | (_$a$ >> 6)]; # 第三个 6-bit 块: byte2 的低 4 位 + byte3 的高 2 位 index3 = ((byte2 & 15) << 2) | (byte3 >> 6) encoded_chars.append(char_set[index3])
# 对应 JS: _$_H[_$jn++] = _$_j[_$a$ & 63]; # 第四个 6-bit 块: byte3 的低 6 位 index4 = byte3 & 63 encoded_chars.append(char_set[index4])
# 对应 JS: _$mx < _$_Q[_$aq[0]] ? (...) : 0; # 处理结尾剩余的字节 remaining_bytes = input_len - input_ptr
if remaining_bytes == 2: # 如果剩下 2 个字节 byte1 = byte_array[input_ptr] byte2 = byte_array[input_ptr + 1]
index1 = byte1 >> 2 encoded_chars.append(char_set[index1])
index2 = ((byte1 & 3) << 4) | (byte2 >> 4) encoded_chars.append(char_set[index2])
# 对应 JS: _$_ex !== _$bv ? _$_H[_$jn++] = _$_j[(_$ex & 15) << 2] : 0 # JS 代码中,如果 byte2 存在,就会执行这一步 index3 = (byte2 & 15) << 2 encoded_chars.append(char_set[index3])
elif remaining_bytes == 1: # 如果剩下 1 个字节 byte1 = byte_array[input_ptr]
index1 = byte1 >> 2 encoded_chars.append(char_set[index1])
# 对应 JS: _$ex = _$_Q[++_$mx] 会导致 _$ex 为 undefined # 所以 ((...)|(_$ex >> 4)) 的后半部分是 0 index2 = (byte1 & 3) << 4 encoded_chars.append(char_set[index2])
# 对应 JS: return _$h4[7][_$aq[45]](_$_H, ''); # 也就是 return _$_H.join(''); return "".join(encoded_chars)
# 提供的字符集 (64个字符)# _$k1.join('')custom_char_set = 'qrcklmDoExthWJiHAp1sVYKU3RFMQw8IGfPO92bvLNj.7zXBaSnu0TC6gy_4Ze5d{}|~ !#$%()*+,-;=?@[]^'
input_arr = [46, 54, 49, 116, 129, 62, 135, 113, 236, 228, 234, 179, 55, 163, 226, 167, 239, 146, 22, 255, 58, 72, 124, 98, 141, 93, 239, 249, 91, 109, 38, 32, 236, 7, 27, 184, 81, 2, 175, 86, 127, 89, 212, 24, 227, 83, 44, 7, 80, 219, 0, 156, 45, 113, 45, 253, 202, 78, 18, 138, 2, 136, 207, 129, 32, 133, 83, 118, 206, 218, 105, 249, 16, 63, 16, 184, 196, 73, 253, 139, 13, 6, 52, 170, 52, 98, 242, 240, 118, 166, 152, 33, 242, 94, 197, 74, 45, 112, 245, 219, 27, 107, 115, 117, 155, 142, 55, 196, 78, 202, 154,158, 82, 141, 110, 77, 173, 168, 201, 88, 151, 206, 13, 23, 242, 248, 100, 55, 241, 113, 98, 31, 97, 165, 150, 5, 11, 119, 27, 146, 8, 111, 246, 172, 120, 46, 66, 170, 188, 211, 84, 233, 51, 94, 171, 200, 253, 121, 12, 27, 56, 104, 180, 25, 40, 22, 107, 84, 110, 29, 94, 92, 189, 165, 53, 195, 233, 58, 51, 213, 137, 47, 0, 23, 112, 94, 224, 82, 7, 36, 145, 92, 113, 31, 31, 146, 131, 251, 140, 205, 128, 165, 255, 47, 220, 28, 99, 5, 250, 133, 167, 59, 200, 160, 105, 236, 205, 83, 225, 216, 15, 148,134, 109, 149, 144, 168, 13, 109, 209, 42, 59, 85, 154, 227, 67, 129, 1, 133, 195, 184, 145, 135, 198, 211, 152, 159, 19, 91, 50, 203, 86, 54, 13, 79, 139, 60, 50, 242, 47, 255, 42, 225, 11, 85, 228, 102, 10, 102, 153, 162, 239, 235, 17, 240, 200, 247, 22, 106, 232, 27, 224, 110, 58, 179, 36, 219, 251, 87, 118, 191, 208, 236, 222, 174, 25, 52, 199, 89, 31, 74, 251, 11, 7, 25, 189, 152, 28, 240, 109, 128, 22, 163, 250, 162, 46, 122, 142, 237, 135, 235, 190, 9, 168, 10, 95, 134, 99, 213, 41, 131, 173,244, 245, 237, 117, 197, 105, 226, 188, 174, 114, 120, 163, 33, 72, 134, 217, 166, 12, 101, 139];
# ---- 测试1: 编码 "Man" ----encoded_man = custom_base64_encode(input_arr, custom_char_set)print(f"Input: {input_arr}")print(f"Encoded len: {len(encoded_man)}")print(f"Encoded: {encoded_man}")
real = 'hO3SwEl5f6o7yijuJ_HPN551mBZ_1oSPOY6B5YzzxPk7rSXgVAtBYveRTrOOVnaoVJ7qvcTShI6tsfttqLOHG1cmV6MiCbvylkZAXWpxd37JrO1jJDhnZoFbbconU7YthUkTCSz.Q6KMOOIls7jFv2tJM9CzjW232ZgJmdhgRkISQKEI3FKKrAz6DyEEMdF78cycj.usYi9uUjBEdU9WDufLzr9LmbzVMfT8UhC2JQHNiOHYP1Zqm6r8gmEoxxmQQpZI9LH4OWCqNIZB6rSOrIjmNuBELDv7uYHfCq5VfbCY9tGJMwljiTKFg0irq3UkXxDoSzi3vSJMW7zKJGTHPuanZPddtXlhY8pbcbFRLXd.lIkEeSRj_rBGMOjuxJB4Y6Fd0iu8.f90ST9I1B7hrSbebruaM3qKLdjPhvji43I.BGbLc25D3eVNG_60e8TTSKvPBtyn8tWf1EMRNGS2Pa'print(real == encoded_man)
_iX[2][6], _iX为函数的第四个参数。
重新断点 IP: 161 Opcode: 47 位置。
对于这种超级大的三元表达式,可以将一整个丢进http://jsnice.org/中进行格式化,可读性更高。

// 方式一jscode = `(function (_$lA, _$cZ) { ....})($_ss.scj, $_ss.aebi);`res = eval.call(window, jscode);
// 方式二function $ss_eval_func(_$lA, _$cZ) { ....}res = $ss_eval_func.call(window, $_ss.scj, $_ss.aebi);抠出来执行总是报错
$_ss.cd 存在cookie值时,是一个一万多位的字符串(不固定,但是稳定在1w+),不存在时是一个1000多位的字符串。
生成逻辑可能不止在主线程中。其实是另一个标签页打开了相同的网站,就会自动更新。
成都多个政府网站使用了该反扒。
主要的vm解释器逻辑位置
function _$mk(_$hz, _$k7, _$$B, _$jt) { var _$g3, _$hF, _$gT, _$iU, _$gP, _$iB, _$lJ, _$$g, _$jL, _$bG, _$c_, _$b4, _$ex, _$hn, _$_D; _$$g = _$hz._$aB, _$jL = _$jt[2], _$bG = _$jt[3], _$c_ = _$jt[0], _$b4 = _$jt[1], _$ex = _$c$._$fn(), _$hn = 0; for (_$g3 = _$k7; _$g3 < _$$B; _$g3++) { _$hF = _$$g[_$g3]; // "IP:", _$g3, "Opcode:", _$hF, "Stack:", JSON.stringify(_$ex.slice(0, _$hn)) // 一大串混淆代码 } }cookie赋值位置
opcode=48

GitHub - pysunday/sdenv: 补环境框架sdenv,完美过瑞数vmp理论通杀,配合瑞数vmp纯算法逆向项目(rs-reverse)更好学习原理
GitHub - pysunday/rs-reverse: 瑞数vmp纯算法逆向,补环境框架sdenv的灵感来源
basearr的适配需要开发人员自己逆,不过内容大差不差(适配一个网站大概用时1天)

自动化补值
使用自动化获取cookie值,从而绕过逻辑获取。
playwright 最多只能获取449位的值,应该被风控检测到自动化浏览器了,尝试了几种隐藏特征的也没有用。不过并不强制要求471位,也可以通过请求。
DrissionPage 即使使用无头模式 直接访问获取即可获取完整可用的 471 位值。好评。
from playwright.sync_api import sync_playwrightfrom playwright_stealth import Stealth
from DrissionPage import Chromium, ChromiumOptions
def get_m9_cookie(): stealthjs = '/Users/tiam/Downloads/stealth.min.js' with Stealth().use_sync(sync_playwright()) as playwright: # with sync_playwright() as playwright: try: browser = playwright.chromium.launch(headless=False) context = browser.new_context() # context.add_init_script(path=stealthjs) page = context.new_page() page.add_init_script(path=stealthjs) page.goto("https://fwgl.zfcxjw.cq.gov.cn:9090/site/cqgzf/extendrentpublic/extendinfopublicity") page.wait_for_timeout(3000) cookies = page.context.cookies() # page.pause() for cookie in cookies: print(cookie) if cookie.get('name') == 'M9RnUaA6zJ2uP': return cookie.get('value') finally: # --------------------- context.close() browser.close()
def get_m9_cookie1() -> str: co = ChromiumOptions() co.incognito() # 匿名模式 co.headless() # 无头模式 co.set_argument('--no-sandbox') # 无沙盒模式 browser = Chromium(co) tab = browser.latest_tab if isinstance(tab, str): return "" tab.get("https://fwgl.zfcxjw.cq.gov.cn:9090/site/cqgzf/extendrentpublic/extendinfopublicity", timeout=5) cookies = tab.cookies() # print(cookies) for cookie in cookies: print(cookie) if cookie.get('name') == 'M9RnUaA6zJ2uP': return cookie.get('value') return ""
if __name__ == "__main__": m9_ck = get_m9_cookie1() if m9_ck: # 正常471位 # 最多449位,还哦差 print("长度:", len(m9_ck)) print("更新cookie:", m9_ck)sdenv补环境
const { jsdomFromText, jsdomFromUrl, browser, logger } = require('sdenv');const fs = require('fs');const path = require('path');const vm = require("vm");
process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0";
const baseUrl = 'https://fwgl.zfcxjw.cq.gov.cn:9090/site/cqgzf/extendrentpublic/extendinfopublicity';const cookie_name = 'M9RnUaA6zJ2uP';
/** * 从cookieJar中提取指定cookie的值 */function extractCookieValue(cookieJar, url, name) { const cookies = cookieJar.getCookieStringSync(url); const parts = cookies.split('; '); for (const part of parts) { const eqIdx = part.indexOf('='); if (eqIdx === -1) continue; const cName = part.substring(0, eqIdx); const cValue = part.substring(eqIdx + 1); if (cName === name) return cValue; } return null;}
/** * 验证cookie是否可用 */async function verifyCookie(cookieValue) { try { const res = await fetch( 'https://fwgl.zfcxjw.cq.gov.cn:9090/site/cqgzf/publicEnquiry/applyAllocationResultList', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36', 'Cookie': `${cookie_name}=${cookieValue}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', }, body: 'isInit=true&pageNumber=1&prefix=&year=2026&sqpq=&hx=&sqhx=&xm=&idCard=&code=1234&tableName=gzf_pzjg', } ); // console.log(await res.json()) console.log(await res.text()) return res.status === 200; } catch (e) { logger.error('验证请求失败:', e.message); return false; }}
/** * 在线模式:直接从网站获取最新数据并生成cookie(推荐) * 每次请求都会获取最新的$_ss数据,避免数据过期问题 */function generateCookieOnline() { return new Promise(async (resolve, reject) => { try { const dom = await jsdomFromUrl(baseUrl, { userAgent: 'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36', consoleConfig: { error: () => {} }, });
dom.window.addEventListener('sdenv:exit', (e) => { if (['location.replace', 'location.assign'].includes(e.detail.eventId)) { const value = extractCookieValue(dom.cookieJar, baseUrl, cookie_name); dom.window.close(); resolve(value); } }); } catch (e) { reject(e); } });}
async function main() { let cookieValue = await generateCookieOnline();
if (!cookieValue) { logger.error('cookie生成失败'); process.exit(1); }
logger.debug('生成cookie值长度:', cookieValue.length); logger.debug('生成cookie值:', cookieValue);
// 验证cookie可用性 const isValid = await verifyCookie(cookieValue); logger.debug('cookie验证结果:', isValid ? '可用 ✓' : '不可用 ✗');
if (!isValid) { logger.error('生成的cookie不可用'); process.exit(1); }}
main().catch(e => { logger.error('执行失败:', e.message); process.exit(1);});
// 使用方式:// 在线模式(推荐): node src/riversecurity/test_sdenv.js online// 离线模式: node src/riversecurity/test_sdenv.js offline/** * 这个网站使用的是瑞数的 $_ss 版本(而非常见的 $_ts 版本), * sdenv 对这个版本的指纹采集范围与真实浏览器有差异, * 导致生成的 cookie 编码前的原始字节数组少了 48 字节(304 vs 352), * 对应 base64 编码后少 64 个字符。 */